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THE LIABILITY OF THE MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TION FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF THE
INDEPENDENT STREET CONTRACTOR
I. INTRODUCTION
A. GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY IN TORT
1. IN GENERAL
The existence of governmental liability in tort has often
been denied,' and still is today; but this view, whether based
on the theory that the king can do no wrong, that "there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends," 2 or on some other supposedly
self-evident'truth, has not passed unchallenged.- The chal-
lenge has come either in the form of new theories to oppose
the old, or in statutes.
2. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
a. The Scope of Inquiry. The scope of our inquiries
is limited to a single branch of the government-the munici-
pal corporation. Here in particular, where the contacts be-
tween the citizen and the government are the closest and
most frequent, we find a fertile field for the development of
counter-theories ' to contend with the older one of govern-
mental non-liability. Among those imposing some liability
on the government is the one suggesting that municipal acts
I See note 34 H A. L. Ra,. 66.
2 BORCHARD, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, V, 36 YALE L. J. 757,
and the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes there cited.
3 Judge Cardozo has suggested our portion of the problem as a suitable
subject for action by a proposed Ministry of Justice., 35 HAR. L. REv. 113, 120.
See also BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 758.
4 34 HAR. L. REv. 67. The reasons there outlined as being those advanced
by the courts for the city's non-liability may, it seems, be put either in the
negative or the affirmative, i. e., the city is not liable, since it received no pecu-
niary benefit; the city is liable since it received such a benefit. Quaere, whether
the latter is not the original form. See also 29 YALE L. J. 911; 37 Id. 389; 26
MICH. L. REv. 222.
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may be either "governmental" or "ministerial" ' and that,
as regards the latter, the municipality is to be treated as any
private corporation or individual.
b. "Distinctions between Governmental and Ministerial
Functions.- Judge Cardozo has written that the indistinct
line of demarcation between the two sorts of functions "has
at best a dubious correspondence with any dividing line of
justice. In many jurisdictions, however . . . it is sup-
ported by precedent so inveterate that the chance of aban-
donment is small." 6
In determining on which side of the line a given case shall
fall, courts use various tests.7 But in some situations the
result of the classification is unconvincing.
"Usually the element of emolument is used as a peg to hang the
term 'ministerial' on. Functions from which incidental and ever so
slight remuneration reaches the municipal coffers have attendant muni-
cipal immunity . . . . But where emolument cannot be found, term
juggling seems to be the modus operandi, and all that can be done
with safety is to determine each case as it arises." s
Nevertheless, tradition has consecrated the view that there
are times when the municipality, can in no wise be held
liable in tort.'. One case,10 while upsetting temporarily the
5 Other terms used for "governmental" are "public" and "political"; for
"ministerial" we find "municipal," "corporate," "proprietary" and "private."
, 35 HAR. L. REv. 113, 120.
Note th6 following examples of classification, cited by Judge Cardozo: "Build-
ing a draw-bridge, maintaining a health department or a charitable institu-
tion, confining and punishing criminals, assaults by policemen, operating an
elevator in a city hall, driving an ambulance, sweeping and cleaning streets, have
all been held governmental acts. Sweeping and cleaning streets, street lighting,
operating electric light plants or water works, maintaining prisons, have been
held private functions." 34 HAR. L. REv. 67.
7 See note 4, supra.
8 26 MIcri. L. REv. 222, 223. Cf. Kuehn v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 263, 65 N.
W. 1030 (1896).
9 Smith v. City of Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506, 513 (1879); Maximilian v.
Mayor, etc., of New York, 62 N. Y. 106 (1875). Cf. Smyth v. City of New
York, 203 N. Y. 106 (1911). On the whole subject see WMITE, NEGLIGENCE OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1920) Chap III. Negligent management of fire
apparatus, as constituting a failure to keep the streets safe, has been held to
impose liability on the city. Martin v. Board of Fire Commissioners, 132 La. 188,
'61 So. 197 (1913); Creps v. City of Columbia, 104 S. C. 371, 89 S. E. 316 (1916).
10 Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Oh. St. 158 (1919). This case was
directly opposed to the previous decisions of the court, and caused considerable
comment at the time. It overruled Frederick v. City of Columbus, 58 Oh. St.
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accepted view that the city is not liable for the negligence of
members of the fire department, recognized that there could
never be liability for failure of the police to enforce the laws.
c. Liability for the Condition of the Streets. As Profes-
sor Borchard has pointed out, "no function of a municipal
corporation is more 'governmental' in character than the
care of the highways, streets and bridges." The fact that
most courts impose liability for defective streets is but fur-
ther evidence of the fundamental unsoundness of the classi-
fication of functions as governmental or ministerial.
In view of the theoretical difficulties involved in applying
the concepts of governmental and ministerial functions so as
to produce wise solutions of the many problems it is perhaps
not surprising to find that the sources of municipal liability
for the condition of the street are not always of the clearest.
In general, of course, the source of liability may be either in
a statute or in the common law.
In some dozen of the American jurisdictions there is no
liability on the part of the municipal corporation for injuries
resulting from defective streets, unless the liability is im-
posed by statute. 12 Such statutes vary widely in their terms
and are usually to be strictly construed, giving a right of
action only for direct injuries to persons using the highway
as travellers. In Connecticut, for example, certain conditions
must concur and no negligence of a third party can in any
way contribute to the result if the city is to be held. 3 On
538 (1898), and was itself overruled in Aldrich v. Youngstown, 106 Oh. St
34 (1922).
11 "In theory, therefore, the city should be immune from responsibility fo
negligence in such matters; and such was the common law. Precisely the oppo
site result, however, constitutes the weight of judicial authority in this country
even in the absence of statute, on the commonly advanced ground that thf
duty of taking care of the public highways is ministerial in character. The con.
clusion deserves approval, though not necessarily the ground on which it i!
based." 34 YAT.E L. J. 1, 63.
12 WHrT, op. cit. supra note 9, §§" 199-204.
13 Frechette v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. 83 (1926); Dyer v. Danbury
85 Conn. 128, 81 Atl. 958 (1911); Gustafson v. City of Meriden, 103 Conn. 59E
(1925). The city is not liable for failure to remove an obstruction constituting
"public nuisance." Hewiston v. City of New Haven, 37 Conn. 475 (1871). Sef
Comment 37 YALE L. J. 389.
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the other hand, under the Maine statute the municipality is
called much more strictly to account. 4 The cause of the
defective condition is immaterial, and liability results even
though it was created by an independent contractor.1"
In by far the greater number of states, however, the city's
liability for the defective condition of the streets has not
been the creation of an express statute. But even in the
'absence of such a statute,'" it is not uncommon to impose
what is sometimes called a "statutory" liability. In one sense
it is statutory, 17 since it is inferred from the terms bf the
municipal charter granting control of the streets to the city,
which may open or close them to traffic, police them. renair
them, and raise taxes for this puipose.18
B. THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
1. IN GENERAL
Municipal corporations can act only through their serv-
ants, agents, or contractors. In respect to them, as well as
to other aggregate corporations; the early view was that they
could not be liable in tort." Later, when this liability came
to be recognized, it was supported either on the ground that
an employer should be responsible for the torts committed
by his employes in the course of their employment, or on
14 ME. REv. STAT. (1903) c. 23, § .76; Tripp v. Lyman, 37 Me. 251 (1854).
15 Butler v. Bangor, 67 Me. 385 (1877).
16 The defective condition is sometimes classified as a nuisance. Neverthe-
les, consistent results do not follow from the use of this concept. In Connecti-
cut, for example, the duty to remove a nuisance upon the highway, endanger-
ing public travel, being a public "governmental" duty, does not make the city
liable for its failure to perform it. Hewiston v. City of New Haven, op. cit.
supra note 13. Contra: Vogel v. The Mayor, etc., 92 N. Y. 10 (1883). In Wyo-
ming a city is under no obligation to abate nuisances. Kent v. Cheyenne, 2 Wyo.
6 (1877). Cf. Woodman v. Metr. R. Co., 149 Mass. 335 (1889).
17 City of Omaha v. Olmstead, 5 Neb. 446 (1877); Goodrich v. City of
University Place, 80 Neb. 774, 115 N. W. 538 (1908); Updike v. City of Omaha,
87 Neb. 228, 127 N. W. 229 (1910).
1 Lowry v. City of Delphi, 55 Ind., 250 (1876).; Centerville v. Woods, 57
Ind. 192 (1877); Logansport v. Dick, infra note 94; Blake v. St. Louis, 40 Mo.
569 (1867); Allentown v. Kramer, 73 Pa. 406, (1873); Todd v. City of Troy,
61 N. Y. 506 (1875).
19 BLACKSTONES COMmENTARIES, Book 1,, 476, 477. But see WLISTO.7,
Business Corporations, 3 SELFCT EssAYs IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, 216.
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the completely different ground that there are certain con-
ditions which the municipality is under a positive duty to
keep safe for. the public. The fqrmer view has become crys-
talized in the rule of respondeat superior.
We are not concerned with the history of this doctrine,
though it is undoubtedly old, and may even date from anci-
ent times.'" More important would be an accurate identifica-
tion of its underlying reasonableness, if that is possible. Mr.
Justice Holmes has indicated the uncertainty, concluding
that "all the proposed tests 21 go to show that the distinction
(between responsibility and non-responsibility) rests on the
remoteness of personal connection between the parties."
2. THE EARLY CASES OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
The general proposition, that a ,person shall be answerable
for an injury, which arises in carrying into execution that, which he
has employed another to do, is perhaps too' large and loose; but. in
the case of Littledale v. Lord Lonsdale, 2 H. BI. 267-299, and in Bush
v. Steinman, 1 Bos. & Pull. 404, the principle was carried to a great
extent . . . . In Bush v. Steinman the decision was this; A., having
a house by the roadside, contracted with B. to repair it for a stipulated
sum- B. contracted with C. to do the work; and C. with D. to furnish
the materials. The servant of D. brought a quantity of lime to the
house and placed it in the rqad, by which the plaintiff's carriage was
overturned; it was held that A. was answerable for the damage sus-
tained." 22
The. famous case of Bush v. Steinman was decided before
the courts had recognized a distinction between the status
of an agent and that of a contractor. -3 We are not interested
in whether the case was properly decided, but it is interesting
to note that each of the three concurring judges gave rather
different grounds for his opinion that the owner of the prop-
erty, who was also the employer, was liable for the negligence
20 0. W. HOLmEs, JR., History of Agency, 3 SELECT ESSAYS iN ANGLO-A-AMR-
ICAN LEGAL HISTORY 377-389.
21 Namely: Choice, Control,'A -Round Sum Paid, Power to Discharge,
Notoriously Distinct Calling. HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 20, at 405-406.
22 STORY, AoNCY (2nd ed. 1844) 577, note.
23 In speaking of the Littledale case, EYRE, C. J., said: "Whether he work
it (the colliery) by agents, by servants, or by contractors, still it was his
work . .. ."
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of the servant of a sub-contractor. Eyre, C. J., indicates that
liability is based on ownership and quotes the maxim sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas on the benefit received from
the work, on the relationship of master and servant between
the primary employer and the sub-contractor's servant, and
on nuisance. Later, when'the doctrine of the independent
contractor had begun to be hinted at, Bush v. Steinman was
generally thought of as a case involving servants who had
employed sub-servants.
2
The independent contractor doctrine appeared in a dis-
tinct, though still primitive form, a little more than a century
ago."-' In a case which Story said exhausted all the prior
learning on the subject, Laugher v. Pointer,-' the holding,
or the implication, of Bush v. Steinman, was put on a much
narrower ground: that "where a man is in possession of
fixed property he must take care that his property is so used
and managed that other persons are not injured, and that,
whether his property be managed by his own immediate
servants or by contractors or their servants." 27
In Laugher v. Pointer it was held that the owner of a
carriage was not liable for the negligence of the driver of the
horses, the driver having been provided by the owner of the
horses which the defendant had hired. It was said that the
driver was the servant of the owner of the horses, and
24 2 KENT'S COMMENTARIES (3rd ed. 1836) 260. The last edition of KENT'S
COMMENTARIES, the 6th, which contained alterations and additions to be made by
the author himself, re-iterates this view. Nevertheless, under the influence of
Burgess v. Gray, 1 C. B. 578 (1845), and the discussion in Laugher v. Pointer,
infra note 26, the author indicates that liability in these cases of fixed property
is supportable on the ground that "the possessor of fixed property must be
responsible for the acts of those whom he employs."
25 HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 20, at 406.
26 5 B. & C. 547 (1826).
27 LITTLEDALE, J., in Laugher v. Pointer, at 559 et seq. He cites also Sly v.
Edgley, 6 Esp. 6, along with Bush v. Steinman. It is not clear whether the
rule of respondeat superior is thought to be inapplicable to these cases where
the owner of fixed property was the employer, but that absolute liability at-
taches, or whether respondeat superior is peculiarly applicable in these cases.
In a way this is rather fundamental from the point of view of theory. The
same problem comes up in connection with the exceptions to the independent
contractor doctrine-are they to be based on respondeat superior, on absolute
liability, or some on one and some on another?
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-further, that he could not be the servant of the traveler also,
for "the law does not recognize a several liability in two
principals who are unconnected."
Laugher v. Pointer vias followed in Quarman v. Burnett "
where the facts were similar, but where the personal connec-
tion between the carriage owner and the driver was consider-
ably closer.2 9 We see, therefore, that the courts felt that there
was a fundamental difference between the employer-owner'
of realty (Bush v. Steinman) and the employer-owner of
personalty (the Laugher and Quarman cases). In the first
situation the employer was liable, even though the negligence
complained of were that of a servant of a sub-contractor,
either on the ground of respondeat superior, or for some
other reason, possibly the mere ownership of realty.
Near the middle of the 19th century the independent con-
tractor doctrine began to assume a more definite form. It
was felt that the result making the employer-owner of real
property liable for the contractor's negligence, while letting
off the employer-owner of personalty, was illogical. If the
view of the Laugher case was correct, Bush v. Steinman
could not be.3"' The owner of real estate should not be placed
in a peculiarly responsible position with respect to the
negligence of independent contractors and their servants.31
Nevertheless, something of the idea still remained, though
obscurely, for when the city employed independent contrac-
tors to construct sewers in the street, the same Michigan
court, less than a decade after the De Forrest case, affirmed
the liability of the city for the negligence of such an agent. 2
28 6 M. & W. 507 (1840).
29 Laugher v. Pointer was decided by a divided court. By 1826, as Wig-
more points out (in his Responsibility for Tortious Acts, 3 SELCT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AuFRICAN IFZGAL HISToRY 534), liability for the agent's f6rts was tested
by phrases "course of employment," or "scope of authority." This is somewhat
complicated by the necessity of defining who is an "agent" or "servant." The
Laugher and Quarman cases might very well have gone the other way.
30 DeForrest v. Wright, 2 Mich. 368 (1852).
31 Milligan v. Wedge, 12 A. & E. 737 (1840). Lord Denman, C. 3., doubted
"whether the distinction as to the law in the cases of fixed property and moveable
property can be relied on." Reedie v. N. W. R. Co., 4 Ex. 244 (1849), overruled
Bush v. Steinman and the distinction between real and personal property except
on the possible ground of nuisance.
32 City of Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165 (1861). Bush v. Steinman was
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3. THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR DOCTRINE
EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE
Meechem, in his treatise on Agency, after stating the
general rule regarding the employer's immunity from liability
for the acts of the independent contractor, 3 indicates vari-
ous exceptions. The following classification of them suggests
itself: " (1) If the thing to be done is unlawful, if it is a
nuisance per se, if it cannot be done without doing damage
to third persons, the employer (or master) who causes
it to be done is liable;'- (2) If the act to be done is by its
nature likely to do damage to third, persons unless precau-
tions are taken, the employer (or master) is liable if the
precautions are not taken and the damage occurs;3" (3) One
who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and keeps
there, anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, keeps it
at his peril, and is liable for the damage which is the natural
consequence of its escape;87 (4) If the law imposes the
overruled in Massachuestts in 1855 in Hillard v. Richardson, 3 Gray 349. In
the 50's the difficulty in the independent contractor cases seems to have been
primarily in defining the master and servant relationship, 2 KENT'S COMMEN-
TARIms (10th ed. 1860) 306. Compare the series of cases in New York culminat-
ing in Stores v. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104 (1858). See also Randleson v. Murray, 8
A. & E. 109 (1838).
83 "If .... the principal, using due care in the selection of the person,
enters into a contract with a person exercising an independent employment,
by virtue of which the latter undertakes to accomplish a given result, being at
liberty to select and employ his own means and methods, and the principal
retains no right or power to control or direct the manner in which the work
shall be done, such a contract does not create the relation of principal and
agent or master and servant, and the person contracting for the work is not
liable for the negligence of the contractor, or his servants in the performance
of the work." MEECHZm, AGENCY (1899) 595.
34 Not in Meechem's exact terms, but based on his discussion. Op. cit.
supra note 33, at 596 et seq.
35 Distingutsh from case (2).
36 Water Co. v. Ware, 16 Wall. 166 (U. S. 1872), is perhaps the most
famous discussion of this phase of the subject.
In each of the classes of exceptions, one should ask whether the employer'r
liability is based on the principle of respondeat superior, which is the expression
of a certain policy of the law, or on some other and different policy, as, for
example, absolute liability in certain cases, i. e., the escape of fire which one
had kindled on one's own land, at common law.
37 (3) and (4) seem to be fundamentally different from (1) and (2) in
that they can be satisfactorily explained even though we ignore, or do not
know of, the existence of the agent. In them we look only to the result. On
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performance of a duty on the employer, he is responsible for
its non-performance by the contractor?
Mr. Justice Holmes has said that common sense is opposed
to the idea of making one man liable for the forts of another,
unless the first induced the doing of the act of which wrong
was the immediate consequence." The first of the two ex-
ceptions to the independent contractor doctrine, as we have
indicated them, seems to be in accord with the test of com-
mon sense, and with the idea that it is the 'superior" who
should be answerable for having willed and caused the in-
jurious act to be done. In our study of the liability of the
municipal corporation for the negligent acts of the indepen-
slent street contractor, we shall see' cases which come within
these classes. Our main interest, however, will be centered
on the cases falling within class (4)-where the law imposes
the performance of a duty on a person, he cannot escape
liability for non-performance by delegating it to another. In
such a case, it seems inexact. to say that liability is predi-
cated on the rules of agency, or the particular doctrine of
respondeat superior.4" -
4. CERTAIN CASES OF NON-DELEGABLE DUTIES
a. Of the Landlord Who Has Agreed to Repair. Sal-
mond's analysis of the situations in which the employer
of an independent contractor may be liable, is somewhat
the other hand, this may be true in some cases of the first two classes. The
extent to which confusion is possible is shown in Gorham v., Gross, 125 Mass.
232 (1878) (defective party wall which fell and crushed plaintiff's building;
wall had been constructed by independent contractor). Proposition (3), in the
main, is based on 1Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868). See CLARK,
THE LAW OF TORTS (1922) 102, note.
38 Gray v. Pullen, 5 B. & S. 970 (1863). A trench was dug across the
road in the exercise of a Parliamentary grant which imposed the duty to refill
it. Such an act, also, may be covered by more than one of the classes we have
named; for example, it may be dangerous unless precautions are taken, as well
as the absolute liability imposed by law. It is submitted, that wherever the
latter exists, the agency question, concerning liability for acts of the independ-
ent contractor, may be put aside as immaterial.
39 HoLMEs, op. cit. supra not6 20, at 404.
40 For an early case hinting at the rule Which was 'to grow later into an
exception to the independent contractor doctrine, see Lowell v. Boston & Lowell
R. Co., 23 Pick. 24 (Mass. 1839).
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different than that we h~fve indicated above.41 We shall
adopt it later in a modified form in discussing the liability
of the municipal corporation for the negligent acts of the
independent street contractor. For the present, however,
it suffices to call attention to his concluding statement on the
subject:
"It would seem clear, therefore, that the vicarious responsibility of
the employers of independent contractors is not the outcome of any
far-reaching general principle, but represents merely a number of
more or less arbitrary exceptions based on special considerations of
public policy." 42
In particular, as he points out, the proposition that the em-
ployer is liable for a breach of a duty imposed by law, even
though the duty was merely to use due care and was per-
formed when a competent independent contractor was em-
ployed, is questionable, from the point of view of the logical
development of the independent contractor doctrine. How-
ever, it seems to me, that, as a pragmatic device which the
law has adopted to place responsibility on the shoulders best
able to bear it in certain cases, the rule is sound. It becomes
a part of the broad policy which imposes absolute liability in
certain cases, without regard to the employer's negligence.43
In illhistration it is worth while to take the case of the
liability of the landlord to the tenant, when the landlord has
agreed to repair.44
41 It includes cases where the employer was negligent in selecting the
contractor-a situation which is almost implicit but which perhaps needs to be
kept in mind. It also distinguishes absolute liability (negligence is immaterial),
absolute liability of a sort (employment permitted only on terms of vicarious
liability), and liability for breach of delegated duties. SALMOND, THE LAW OF
TORTS (5th ed. 1920) 119 et seq.
42 SALMOND, op. cit. supra note 41, at 125.
43 The concept of "absolute liability" seems to be confused by Salmond.
Is it (1) the existence, of negligence which is immaterial, or (2) the fact that
whose negligence it is, that is immaterial? If we say the latter, and it appears
to be the only tenable "ew, the scope of the employer's absolute liability is
much broader, including particularly the non-delegable duties.
Quaere, Whether "absolute liability" is not a misnomer, anyway? It is never
imposed when the damage was caused by an act of God, except in some cases
of nuisances. See SALMOND, op. cit. supra note 41, at 239.
44 In the absence of fraud and of an agreement, the lessor is not liable to
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If the landlord has agreed to repair, and has done noth-
ing4 in regard to the work,4" the weight of authority seems
to be that an injured tenant cannot predicate an action in
tort upon the failure to make repairs,4" though the failure
constitutes a breach of the contract and caused the injuries.
Whether or not the landlord was under an obligation to
make repairs, if he in fact makes them negligently, he will
be liable for the injuries resulting from the defective condi-
tion. For positive acts of negligent misfeasance, he is
liable.48 This is clear if he does the acts causing the defective
condition himself or through his servants. But if the land-
lord employs an independent contractor to do the work in-
stead of doing it himself, and the work is negligently done,
upon what principle can the landlord be held liable? Can
we say that there is an "absolute liability," a liability with-
out fault on the part of the person liable, in the sense we
suggested above,"0 and is this idea to be identified with that
the lessee, or others lawfully on the premises, for their condition, or that they
are- tenantable. Jaffe v. Harteau, 56 N. Y. 398 (1874); Silverman v. Isaacs,
183 App. Div. 542 (1918).
45 In New York it is settled 'that an agreement to repair by the landlord
may not be made the basis of an action for personal injuries, so long as noth-
ing has been done under'the agreement. Miller v. Rinaldo, 21 Misc. 470 (1897);
Schick v. Fleischauer, 26 Hun. 210 (1898) ; Kushes v. Ginsburg, 99 App. Div. 417
(1904).
46 There is great confusion in the different jurisdictions. In Connecticut
the landlord is liable to the tenant or to those in privity with him for injuries
to property or person- because of the breach of a covenant to repair. Stevens
v. Yale, 101 Conn. 683 (1925) (with a discussion of the situation in various
states at 689 et seq.). Recovery allowed ex contractu, as being within the con-
templation of the parties, in Hart v. Coleman, 201 Ala. 345, 78 So. 201 (1918).
An action lies for the landlord's negligent failure to make such repairs as were
agreed on, if injury results from the failure. Robinson v. Heil, 128 Md. 645,
98 At. 195 (1916).
47 Kuyk v. Green, 219 Mich. 423, 189 N. W. 25 (1922); Turner v. Ragan,
229 S. W. 809 (Mo. 1921); Davis v. Smith, 26 R. I. 129, 58 Atl. 630 (1904).
Cf. Hart v. Coleman, supra note 46.
48 Smith v. Tucker,' 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S. W. 66 (1925); Murrell v.
Crawford, 102 Kan. 118, 169 Pac. 561 (1918); SALmON'D, op. cit. supra note 41,
at 424; CLARK, op. cit. supra note 37, at 159.
4.1 We are using absolute liability in the sense which makes the test of its
existence the fact that negligence, whether on the part of the servant or the'
master, the contractor or the employer, is immaterial. In such a case, we may.
say that the employer has a non-delegable duty; likewise that the performance
of such a duty is imposed by law. This seems to the author a scientific classi-
fication, but as it is not entirely convenient it will not be rigorously adhered to.
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of non-delegable acts? The answer is not a perfectly easy
one. It has already been suggested that the exceptions to
the general rule of th& independent contractor are quite
arbitrary. If we classify them, it is for necessity or conven-
ience, rather than because the classification is inherent in the
law. However, if we start by admitting that as soon as the
landlord has begun repairs, or caused them to be begun, it
is up to him to prevent their resulting in a defective condi-
tion, we have laid the basis for an absolute liability and
created a non-delegable duty-the duty to see that the re-
pairs are properly prosecuted. If there is negligence, it is
immaterial whose negligence it is-the landlord will never-
theless be liable for defective conditions brought about by
repairs which he caused to be started. If there is a duty
to act, the law imposes a corresponding duty not to act
negligently which attaches to the person having the primary
duty. He may employ an independent contractor, but he
still has to perform both duties and is liable for their non-
performance. Thus, as it seems to the writer, what are
known as non-delegable duties are composed of two ele-
ments, but which go together-the dut3r to do the act, and
the duty to refrain from doing it negligently.5" If there is
failure in regard to either, the person under the primary duty
becomes absolutely liable. In the case of a gratuitous under-
taking by the landlord to repair, the primary duty attaches
during the prosecution of the work, along with the other duty
to prevent its resulting in defective conditions. 51
In Vollrath v. Stevens52 the landlord undertook to repair,
in the absence of a covenant requiring him to do so. He
employed an independent contractor to do the work. The
court said:
50 Thus answering the objection that the non-delegable duty may consist
merely in choosing a competent contractor. SALMOND, op. cit. supra note 41, at
123. Such a duty is not a non-delegable duty. If the employer had been unable
to find a contractor and had had to use a servant, the result would have been
the same, even though the servant were highly competent.
51 Gill v. Middletown, 105 Mass. 477 (1870).
52 199 Mo. App. 5, 202 S. W. 283 (1918).
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"If the lessor undertakes to have repairs made when he has not
covenanted to do so, a duty is cast upon him to see that the repairs
are made so as not to injure the tenant, and the rule of independent
contractor has no application." (Italics are the writer's.)
Likewise, in Rosenberg v. Zeitchik' 3 the court said that
"it was the duty of- the landlord to make repairs, and the fact that
he made a contract with some one to do the work does not relieve
him from liability for negligence to his tenant. It cannot well be
claimed that the leaving, unguarded for several minutes . . . of a
furnace, with a dipper of molten lead on top, was not a negligent act."
The tenant was allowed to recover for the injuries to his
infant child.54
We may, perhaps, conclude that the landlord is liable for
repairs negligently made, that is, he is liable absolutely in
the sense that it does not matter whose negligence (his own,
his servant's or his contractor's) was in question. 5 But if
the landlord's contractor is not making repairs in the ten-
ant's particular portion of the building, as regards that ten-
ant, he is not making repairs at all, and the ordinary rules
of the employer's non-liability must be applied. 6
53 52 Misc. Rep. 153 (1906).
54 Cf. Blake v. Fox, 17 N. Y. S. 508 (1892).
Contra: Ebblin v. Millers Exrs.. 78 Ky. 371 (1880). The opinion goes on
the ground that the landlord is not liable unless he was negligent in employing
the contractor. The case is perfectly logical unless we are prepared toadmit
that there is a non-delegable duty to prosecute repairs, once they are under-
taken, in a non-negligent manner;-or, in other words, that there is an absolute
liability for repairing negligently, whether the negligence be that of the landlord.
his servants, or his contractor. The landlord is not liable for "collateral negli-
gence"--a term hard to define, but none the less useful. In O'Connor v.
Schneple, 12 Misc. Rep. 356, 33 N. Y. S. 562 (1895), the contractor was fix-
ina a chimney and knocked soot into the stove in the tenant's apartment. His
son received a severe fright, inhaled the soot, and later died. Held, the land-
lord was not liable. The court said, "The doing of the repairs, if they w~re not
negligently made, could not have involved any liability upon the landlord for
the soot."
55 It is thought that this view of absolute liability is thoroughly sup-
ported by the decisions. It can, of course, b argued that it is not absolute, be-
cause if there had been no negligence at all there would have been no liability.
It might just as well be argued that it is not absolute because there is no liabil-
ity if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. It is not denied, be it
noted, that there is another sort of absolute liability-liability without fault
anywhre, or on the part of anyone. This is rare in tort, however common it
may be'in criminal law. '
56 Fitzgerald v. Timoney, 13 Misc. Rep. 327, 347 N. Y. S. 460 (1895).
The court calls the workman a "servant." While working in the apartment above
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b. Of the Landowner to Business Guests When He Has
Retained Control of the Premises. It is generally held that
the landowner (or landlord) is liable for defects in those
portions of the premises over which he has retained control.57
This liability extends to injuries to tenants, their families,
and persons using the common portions of the building or
land to visit the tenants. The implied invitation to use the
premises is the basis of the owner's liability. 8
The owner's duty in such a case is said to be "to use
reasonable Eare to keep the premises in repair and suitable
condition for the use of the tenants."
Though the tenant and his guests are not strictly "business
guests" of the landlord or owner, perhaps; the duty owed
by the owner is the same as in the case of customers in a
store, etc.59
If the owner charges an independent contractor with the
duty of putting the premises in condition, is his liability
affected? o The case is particularly important as presenting
the plaintiff's, laying the floor, his foot slipped, causing the plaster below to
fall, and iniurin, the plaintiff. Held, the landlord was not liable.
57 Dillehay v. Minor. 188 Iowa 37 (1920); Idell v. Michell, 5 App. Div. 268
(1896); Peil v. Rheinard, 127 N. Y. 381 (1890); McNab v. Wallin, 13 Minn.
370. 158 N. W. 623 (1916); Roman v. King, 289 Mo. 641, 233 S. W. 161, 25
A. L. R. 1263 (1921). This rule applies not only to halls, steps, etc., but to a
defective dumb waiter, Blake v. Fox, 17 N. Y. S. 508 (1892); and to defective
plumbing, whereby boiling water was run into the toilet tank, Wardman v.
Hanlon, 280 Fed. 988 (1922). Cf. Kinnier v. J. R. M. Adams, Inc., 142 Md.
305. 129 Atl. 838 (1923).
Notice of the defect must be given to the landlord. Henkel v. Marr, 31
Hun. 28 (1883).
58 Curtis v. Kiley, 152 Mass. 123 (1891).
!"') CLARK. op. cit. supra note 37, at 151-52, 159.
(;0 Consider several cases: (1) The contractor is in charge of the premises
when an injury occurs because-of a condition existing before his coming and
independent of his work. The owner's liability is not affected. (2) The con-
tractor is in charge and creates'a condition, in the performance of his work,
which'causes the injury. (3) The contractor is in charge and creates a con-
dition, independent of his work, which causes the injury. In (2) the owner
should be held to have anticipated the condition and assumed its danger. In
(3) is not the situation like that where a defective condition is created by
accident or by a stranger? The owner should be liable if he has had notice, etc.
If he is liable, it is still a case of absolute liability under our definition; he con-
trolled the property, and is implied to have invited guests to use it. It does
not matter whether the contractor was negligent in creating the condition or
the owner in not having notice or not acting after notice.
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a close analogy to that of the liability of the municipal
corporation for the defective conditions of the street, created
by an independent contractor.
In Sciolaro v. Asch " the owner of the building employed
a firm of independent contractors to furnish elevator service.
The plaintiff, who was -employed by tenants, was injured
while leaving the elevator, through the negligence of the
operator. It was held that the owner was liable. The court
said that
"as to all persons having business in the building the law imposed
on the owner the duty of seeing that the premises were in reasonably
safe condition for access and ingress . . . . This was a personal duty
which the appellant could not delegate . . . The master, the inn-
keeper, and the landlord assume certain duties that can only be dele-
gated subject to the legal responsibility which inheres in the primary
obligation." 62
Curtis v. Kiley6 3 takes us one step nearer the cases of the
city's liability for the conditions created by the independent
street contractor. A person coming to see the tenant fell
into a hole opened by the owner's independent contractor. It
was held that the owner was liable, since he employed the
contractor to do work which was likely to render the premises
more dangerous and since he had control of the premises,
and because he could not "continue to hold out the invita-
tion without being bound to exercise due care."
c. The Basis of Liability. The.foregoing discussion of
certain cases of non-delegaible duties has not been offered
either as a new classification of tortious responsibilty 64 or
01- 198 N. Y. 77 (1910).
62 Accord: Besner v. Central Trust Co. of New York, 230 N. Y. 357
(1921). The decision was based on two grounds: (1) the owner's non-delegable
duty, so that he was always liable for negligence in the operation of the ele-
vator; (2) the operation of the elevator made the decedent's employment in-
herently dangerous.
63 153 Mass. 123 (1891).
64 8 CAL. L. REV. 192, contrasting the twofold Norman classification of
acts of misadventure and willful acts with the threefold modern classification of
willful acts, acts done at peril, and acts negligently done, which is said to have
resulted more or less indirectly from Rylands v. Fletcher, supra note 37.
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as an exposition of new theory,"' but merely in an effort to
define what we mean by non-delegable duty and by absolute
liability. For purposes of the discussion to follow we state
our conclusions as below. However little novel they may be,
it is well to keep them in mind in considering a subject where
the concepts aye so intangible.
I Tortious liability may be classified as:
(a) liability with fault; (b) liability without fault.
II The fault in each case is always strictly the fault of
the person sought to be charged.
III Whenever an employer is liable for the acts of a
competent independent contractor, we have a case of
liability without fault ("absolute liability").
IV If, in the case last mentioned, the employer was
negligent in selecting a contractor (or in over-seeing
his work, if he was charged with that duty) we would
have an additional reason for imposing liability;,but,
the liability is, primarily, liability without fault.
V The idea of a non-delegable duty a primary duty anc
co-extensive secondary. duty to perform the first
without fault. That is, it is proper to say that the
duty to use due care in the selection of an indepen-
dent contractor is co-extensive with a duty to select
the contractor; but it is not co-extensive with doing,
as a primary duty, certain work, for which we choose
to hire an independent contractor rather than
a servant.
Let it be said that these somewhat dogmatic statements are
not intended to contradict others who have used the terms
in a different sense, but to indicate the sense which is given
them in this paper.6
65 Ci. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 104-109; THAYER, Liabil-
ity Without Fault, 29 HAR. L. REv. 801.
00 Oti the above section, see: BOHLEN, Landlord and Tenant, 35 HAR. L.
REv. 633, 646; supra note 23.
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II. THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND THE INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR
We have already seen q7 that the municipal corporation is
almost universally held to be liable for the defective condi-
tion of the streets. We now pass to a consideration of the
bases and extent of that liability when the condition causing
the injury was brought about by an independent contractor.
The whole question may be profitably examined in the light
of Dean Thayer's remarks, given below:
The doctrine "by which the defendant "vho has employed an
independent contractor may be liable for the consequences of the
contractor's negligence, though himself' free from fault in selecting
the contractor or in any particular, is sometimes misleadingly stated as
though respondeat superior were somehow, involved. To say that the
contractor is treated as the owner's servant is merely to misstate the
situation; it is negatived by the very proposition that he is an inde-
pendent contractor. The true statement of the case is that the law
charged the defendant with a non-delegable duty. Though it be only
a duty of care, it is a duty to see that care be used, whatever .the
agency which he employs to do the work. Sometimes this result flows
naturally from the circumstances creating the duty,' as where it is
attached to some right or privilege the giver of which looked to the
defendant's personal responsibility.". 68
The clearest exposition of the idea that .exceptions to the
general rule of the employer's non-liability for the acts of
the independent contractor are not based on the theory of
respondeat superior, so far as *the writer is aware, is found
in an opinion by Judge Burch, of Kansas.
"It has not been established that the construction company was
free from fault (in not lighting the excavation) and the cause now
stands in the same situation as if separate suits had been brought and
the one against the construction company -had not yet been tried.
Besides this, the case is not one in which it is charged that a servant
committed a tortious act for which his master is liable, on the principle
of respondeat superior. In such cases primary liability to answer for
the act rests on the servant. The master is liable only because he
67 Supra notes 11-18.
68 THAYER, op. cit. supra note 65, at 808.
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must respond for the acts of the servant, and if the servant be ad-
judged free from fault there is nothing for which the master should
respond ....
"The city owed the plaintiff an original, independent and primary
duty to keep its streets in reasonably safe condition for use." 69
"Notice" as -an Element of a Non-Delegable Duty. It
may be urged, and quite properly, that where it is required
that the city should have notice of the defective condition
of the street before it can be held liable therefor, it cannot
be said that the city's liability for defective streets is abso-
lute. But if we say, on the other hand, that the city's pri-
mary duty is to use reasonable care to see that the streets
are reasonably safe for the public use, its co-extensive coun-
terpart is that there shall be no negligent failure on the part
of the city or any one under it to use such reasonable care-
that there is a duty to use such reasonable care, and liability
for failure is absolute. This does not preclude the require-
ment of notice as an element of the non-delegable duty to use
reasonable care to see that the streets are reasonably safe.70
69 Roger v. Coffeyville, 95 Kan. 171, 147 Pac. 816 (1915).
Dean Thayer and judge Burch are certainly correct in saying that respondeat
superior is not in question in all of those exceptions to the independent con-
tractor doctrine in which there is absolute liability-a primary and a non-
delegable duty. In them the employer does not answer for the contractor's
wrong-there may have been none in the Coffeyville case-but for his own
failure in regard to the non-delegable duty. An example of the misuse of the
term respondeat superior is found in Jefferson v. Chapman, 127 Il1. 438, 20
N. E. 33 (1889). But where the exception to the general rule is based on the
inherently dangerous nature of the act to be done, quaere, Whether respondeat
superior is not applicable? Chicago v. Murdock, 212 II. 9, 72 N. E. 46 (1904).
In accord with the views of Judge Burch, see Savannah v. Waldner, 49 Ga.
316 (1873).
In Karpinski v. South River, 85 N. J. L. 208 (1913), it was held that
the independent contractor of a municipal corporation furnishing electric light
to private consumers under a franchise is the agent of the corporation when
he negligently strings electric wires on the public street causing injury.
70 Courts may say: (1) In certain cases notice is not required, or that it
is implied, or that the city is bound to take notice of the character of work
which is. by its nature, dangerous to the public. Jefferson v. Chapman, 127
Ill. 438, 20 N. E. 33 (1889); Birmingham v. McCrary, 84 Ala. 477, 4 So.
634 (1888).
Or, it may be said: (2) The city is not liable unless it has reasonable
notice. It is obvious that then the question of what is notice may decide the
case, and may be used by the courts in interpreting their views of public policy
in particular situations. If the defect in question is created by an agent of the
city, the city has notice, Tewksbury v. Lincoln, 84 Neb. 571, 121 N. W. 991
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A. TiE DIFFERENT BASES OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
If a municipal corporation is under a non-delegable duty to
keep its streets reasonably safe, and they are not kept rea-
sonably safe, and an accident results, we need not look far
afield for the source of the municipality's liability. It results
from the failure to keep the streets in a specified condition
,described as being one of reasonable safety-by the use
of reasonable care. What is reasonable safety is a variable
standard, as well as what is reasonable care, but these are
standards at least, and serve a purpose. Some courts have
gone so far as to hold that the negligent driving of fire
engines breached the duty to keep the streets safe for travel-
lers," and this would seem to be correct if we can say that
reasonable care on the part of the municipal authorities,
regarding the streets, was wanting in these cases.
Though the essential basis of the city's liability is the non-
delegable duty which we have beeh at such pains to delimit,
it will be necessary to examine it in connection with other
possible bases of municipal liability, namely, the negligence
of the city, its absolute liability for the work performned, and
a third class in which the city may not have been negligent
and where it is not absolutely liable for the work performed.
(1909); or by a licensee, Davis v. Omaha, 47 Neb. 836, 66 N. W. 859 (1896)
(dictum); or, in some cases, by an independent contractor, who is assimilated
to an agent for the purpose, Omaha v. Jensen, 35 Neb. 68, 52 N. W. 833
(1892).
Cf. Bailey' v. Winston, 157 N. C. 252, 72 S. E. 966 (1911). The better
view seems to be that of Hugo v. Nance, 39 Okla. 640, 135 Pac. 346 (1913)
(the case of an excavation made by an independent contractor across the
sidewalk), where the court held that the city was not bound to take notice of
the character of the work done on its streets, whether safe or dangerous.
71 WHiTE, op. cit. supra note 9, § 66; Martin v. Board of Fire Commissioners,
132 La. 188, 61 So. 197 (1913); Creps v. City of Columbia, 104 S. C. 371, 89
S. E. 316 (1916). It seems questionable, however, whether moving objects should
come within the rule, unless it is apparent that they render the street unsafe.
Cf. WHiTE, op. cit. supra note 9, §§367, 370: "An illegal use of the highway
by men, animals, vehicles, etc., while moving and actually being moved by
human will and direction . . . -will not render the town liable for damages oc-
casioned by horses taking fright .... It would be quite different for towns,
whatever powers they possessed, or however diligent they might. be, to guard
against annoyances of so shifting and temporary a nature."
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1. NEGLIGENCE OF THE CITY
It seems obvious that an employer may be liable if he
"fails to use due care to employ a reasonably competent
contractor." 72 In such a case he is 'liable because he was
negligent. If he had not been negligent, though the con-
tractor had been, according to the general rule the employer
would not be liable.7" But our question is a different one:
Where the employer is negligent in selecting a contractor in
the' performance of a non-delegable duty, and injury results
from the contractor's negligent acts, on what ground shall
the liability be placed? "
It is a general rule that the employer is liable for the
contractor's negligence resulting in a failure to perform a
non-delegable duty.75 Such a duty may be imposed by com-
mon-law or ly statute.76
If the employer is bound to do a certain act, and not to
do it negligently, that is, he has a non-delegable duty, is his
selection of an incompetent independent contractor mater-
ial? 77 Doubtless it may be an additional reason for imposing
liability, as in cases where there is no non-delegable duty, but
would not the result be the same in spite of negligence idi
selecting the contractor?
72 Berg v. Parsons, 84 Hun. 60 (1895); Norwalk Gas Light Co. v. Borough
of Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495, 28 Atl. 32 (1893); Conners v. Hennessey, 112 Mass.
96 (1873).
73 Carr v. Stevens, 295 Fed. 701 (1924); Engel v. Eureka Club, 137 N. Y.
100, 32 N. E. 1052 (1893).
74 Where a contractor fails to perform a non-delegable duty, the employer
is liable whether or not the contractor was negligent. Roger v. Coffeyville, supra
note 69.
75 Jefferson v. Chapman, 127 Ill. 438, 20 N. E. 33 (1889); Deming v.
Terminal R. Co., 169 N. Y. 1, 61 N. E. 983 (1901); Birmingham v. McCrary,
supra note 70; Woodman v. Metr. R. Co., 149 Mass. 335, 21 N. E. 482 (1889).
The Coffeyville case is a more accurate statement-the contractor's negli-
gence is immaterial; the employer is not liable for his negligence, but for re-
sults of it; he would be liable if the same results had been produced without
the contractor's negligence.
76 Bower v. Peate, 1 Q. B. D. 321 (1876); Toledo Brewing Co. v. Bosch,
41 C. C. A. 482, 101 Fed. 530 (1900); Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Stein-
brock, 61 Oh. St. 215, 55 N. E. 618 (1899).
77 Negligence of the contractor in doing the work raises no presumption 'of
negligence in employing him. Hawke v. Brown, 28 App. Div. 37, 50 N. Y. S.
1032 (1898).
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY: NEGLIGENCE
In Goodwin v. Mason . the wall of the defendant's build-
ing, constructed by an independent contractor, collapsed,
killing the plaintiff's intestate., It was held that the defend-
ants had an absolute duty to exercise ordinary care and skill
in the construction of the building.
"'The duty thus resting upon the defendants was one which they
could not fulfill by the employment of a competent mason. . . . As.
far as it went, it was an absolute.,duty, and nothing short of an actual
performance of it . . . would excuse them.'
"Due care in the selection of a contractor" would not constitute
a defense and was not relevant to any issue in the case. Defendants'
duty was absolute and, regardless of care they may have displayed
in selecting a superintendent to construct the building or their con-
fidence in his skill or ability, they were responsible for the exercise
of ordinary care and skill in the actual work."
The negligence of the municipal corporation in supervis-
ing the work of the independent contractor raises a somewhat
different question. In the first place, supervision of the work
to the extent of taking notice of its character, whether safe
or dangerous, would seem to be required from the mere fact
that the city is under a non-delegable duty as regards the
reasonably safe condition of the streets.7 9 And if the city
actually undertakes to control and direct the work of the
contractor," ' he ceases to be a contractor and becomes a
servant or agent, with the resulting application of the doc-
trine of respondeat superior.S
Instead of holding .the employer negligent in selecting the contractor, a simi-
lar result is sometimes reached by holding that the contractor created a nuisance,
for which the employer could not escape liability. Sturges v. Cambridge Society.
etc., 130 Mass. 414 (1881).
78 173 Iowa 546, 155 N. W. 966 (1916).
79 Hugo v. Nance, supra note 70.
SO General supervision as to' regults does not constitute such control as to
render the contractor a servant. Hawke v. Brown, supra note 77. Control of the
contractor was held to create the relationship of master and servant in Brooks
v. Somerville, 106 Mass. 271 (1871). The town's obligation to care for the
streets seems to have been an important element in determining whether Eontrol
existed. The test is not the exercising of control, but the right to exercise it.
Linnehan v. Rollins, 137 Mass. 123 (1884).
81 Tuscon v. Dunseath, 15 Ariz. 355 (1914); Chicago v. Murdock, supra
,note 69; Thillman v. Baltimore, 111 Md. 131, 73 Atl. 722 (1909); Hugo v.
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Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that in cases where
the city is under a non-delegable duty to keep the streets in
safe condition for travel, its negligence in selecting the con-
tractor, as well as negligence in supervision, either' because
supervision must be construed as notice of the defect or be-
cause it created the relationship of master and servant, is
merely a concurring basis of municipal liability, and, for that
reason, is immaterial.
This conclusion is not one of merely technical importance,
for it raises the question of fundamental policy. It is prob-
ably well to say that the employer should be liable when he
is negligent in selecting a contractor or in supervising his
servants. The reason is, in either case, that care in work
which he causes to be started for his own purposes is reason-
ably within his control. In one case, he negligently selected
a poor instrument when he should have selected a good one;
in the other the personal connection is so close that it is
reasonable that the superior should respond. But the
policy of requiring the city to keep safe its streets is even
stronger, and should be kept clearly before the courts as the
one to put decisions on. Safety on the streets is for the
benefit of the public and the public, through the city, should
be required to take all reasonable steps to insure safety.
Injuries for failure to do so ought, it would seem, to be
compensated for through the public treasury. In other
words, the city, as employer of independent street contrac-
tors, occupies a peculiarly important place in the scheme of .
the independent contractor doctrine, and for that reason its
liabilities should be clearly seen to follow from its anomalous
status. In more general terms, whenever an employer is
liable because of failure to discharge a non-delegable duty,
liability should be predicated by the courts on that failure
rather than on a possible other ground.
Nance, supra note 70; Blumb v. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 112, 54 Am. Rep. 87
(1884); Kuehn v. Milwaukee, 92 Wisc. 263, 65 N. W. 1030 (1896). Cf. Picher
v. Lennon, 12 App. Div. 356, 42 N. Y. S. 156 (1896).
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2. ABSOLUTE LIABILITY FOR THE WORK PERFORMED
Absolute liability as we have discussed it so far, has had
reference to liability growing out of failure .to keep the
streets in a safe condition. There is also a sort of absolute
liability which is imposed because of the character of the
work which the employer directs to be done. For example,
"E" contracts with "C" for certain work which "C" is to
perform. "E" is under no duty to do the work in the first
place and we have no question of non-delegable duty in the
sdnse we have used that term. But the law may say that
"E" will be liable for injuries resulting from the work, either
(1) because of methods to be used in its prosecution, or
(2) because of the character of the completed work. As an
example of the first class we have certain cases of blasting;
of the second, nuisance. We may say, then, that the city
is liable absolutely in certain cases not only because of its
non-delegable duty in regard to the streets, but also because
che character of the work performed by the independent
contractor imposed absolute liability.
Liability for Blasting. Our discussion has throughout
been directed primarily toward those cases where persons on
the street have been injured. It is submitted that there is a
fundamental difference between such cases and those where
injury occurs to persons or property on adjacent land. In
the latter class of cases, the liability of the city would seem
to be the same as that of adjacent landowners to each other.
The city's control of the streets, and its liability for injuries
based on that control, should probably not be given an ex-
ceptional status as regards persons or property not on the
streets. If this is so, the doctrine of Pack v. The Mayor, etc.
of New York 82is of little authority in itself for hoiding
the city not liable when the injuryoccurs on the street, from
acts committed on the street. In the Pack case, blasting by
the servants of an independent contractor resulted in in-
juries from stones falling on plaintiff's house. Moreover, all
the reasoning of the case is drawn from the assumption that
82 8 N. Y. 222 (1853).
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"the immediate employer of the agent-or servant through
whose negligence an injury occurs, i§ alone responsible for
the negligence of such agent or servant." Since the principle
of respondeat superior was narrowly limited to cases of the
"immediate employer," it was felt that in no other case could
vicarious liability attach. A year later, in Kelly v. The
Mayor, etc. of New, York 83 the court did not seem to
feel that any different principle was involved when blasting
on one road caused injury t'o a traveller on another. The
employer, the city, was not liable simply because the doctrine
of respondeat superior was inapplicable. The result of these
two cases was the formulation of a definite rule, hard to sup-
port Where the injury occurs on the street, that the city is
not liable for injuries caused by blasting on the street by its
independent contractors. In Herrington v. Lansingburg "
the Pack and Kelly cases were considered sufficient author-
ity for holding that when the sewer contractors fired a blast
and frightened the plaintiff's team, tied to a post in a village
street, with the result that the plaintiff was injured while
trying to control them, the village was not liable. It was
admitted by all concerned that if the injury had been caused
by falling rocks, no liability would have resulted. Yet such
a result is entirely out of line with the view, already ac-
cepted in New York shortly after the Pack and Kelly cases,"
that the city, having control of the streets, Pmust be deemed
negligent in not protecting the public from dangers created
by its independent contractors.
Injuries caused by high explosives are peculiar in that the
act causing injury may occur in one place, whereas the re-
sulting injury may occur either in the same place or at one
at a considerable distance and under entirely different con-
trol. Moreover, when the injury is to adjacent property,
it may be the result of what is technically a trespass by the
8311 N. Y. 432 (1854).
8f 110 N. Y. 145, 17 N. E. 728 (1888).
8i Storrs v. The City of Utica, supra note 32. The injury there resulted
from the city's failure to protect an open excavation created by an independent
contractor. It was thought material that the injury "resulted frqm the work
itself, however skillfully performed."
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falling rocks, or it may be caused by Vibrations in the earth.
We need to consider only two of these cases: (1) the blast
is not fired on the highway, but the injury occurs there;
(2) the blast is fired on the highway, and the injury occurs
there also. If there is absolute liability in the first instance
for the work performed, it would seem that there should be
in the second also; ,but this, in the latter case, would be
independent of the absolute liability imposed on the city for
its failure to control and keep safe the streets. (We are not
considering the question of nuisance for the moment.)
The, complete extent of the acceptance of the rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher 86 may be uncertain in this country, yet
where the work may be said to be inherently dangerous, or
that it will be apt to do damage unless guarded against, the
owner of the land is generally said to be liable if he failed to
take due care to prevent harm.87 Whether blasting is of
such a character as to impose liability will depend on the
circumstances. 8 Consequential damage which could not be
.The error which, as it seems to the writer, resulted in the decision in the
Herrington case, was emphasis on the fact that the contractor controlled the
work, but a failure to consider the fact that the village was charged with con-
trol of the street. Earle, J., said: "If there was any culpable carelessness which
caused the injury to the plaintiff, it was that of the contractors. They had en-
tire control of the work and the manner of performance. They could choose
their own time for firing the blasts and select their own agent and instrumental-
ity. They could make the charges of powder large or small, and they could in
some degree smother the blasts so as to prevent falling rocks, and much of the
noise of the explosion . . . . If it was a prudent thing to notify persons in the
vicinity of the blast before it was fired, then the contractor should have given
notice; but the duty to give it did not devolve upon the village." (Italics are the
author's.) It seems that the duty of the village to keep its streets safe is over-
looked, as we suggested above.
86 Supra note 37.
87 Wetherbee v. Partridge, 175 Mass. 185, 55 N. E. 894 (1900). The con-
trol contemplated, blasting. It was clear that the performance of the contract
would do the damage complained of unless guarded against. Holmes, C. J., said,
relying on Woodman v. Metr. R. Co., supra note 75, that in some such cases it
would be a matter for the jury as to whether the danger was so great as to
make the defendant liable. That is, the employer would be liable for the results
of blasting by the independent contractor, and at his peril, if the danger were
imminent enough. See, also, Hounsome v. Vancouver Powder Co., 23 West. L.
Rep. 167 (Brit. Col. Ct. App. 1913), discussed in Comment'26 HAL L. REv. 650;
Hay v. Cahoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159 (1849).
88 Berg v. Parsons, 156 N. Y. 109, 50 N. E. 957 (1898).. No liability where
the work is lawful and necessary for the use and improvement of real property,
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clearly foreseen will not, at least in many cases, render the
owner of the land liable. But it has been held that the use
of high explosives in a populous neighborhood or near a
public highway is so fraught with danger that the person
using the same is liable for injury without proof of
negligence." Thus it has been held that both the city and
the independent contractor are liable when the latter, while
constructing a sewer in a proper manner, damaged the
plaintiff's house through vibrations caused by blasting, the
work being intrinsically dangerous."
If we can reasonably accept the doctrine that a man may
not use his own property so that injury occurs to persons
nearby, or to adjacent property-and in spite of the diffi-
culty in reconciling the blasting cases, so much seems of
fairly universal acceptance, except where the injury is "con-
sequential"--there would seem to be particularly good
reasons for applying it to cases of injury occurring on the
highways, from blasts on adjacent property.
If a private employer engages a contractor to do work in
the prosecution of which high explosives will be used, in-
juries caused to persons using the public highways will ren-
der the employer liable."1  It is not entirely clear whether
if there is no statute and the work does not constitute a public nuisance. The
case gives no proper consideration to the dangerous character of the work and
is put primarily on the narrow ground of the non-applicability of the doctrine
of respondeat superior. Cf. Hay v. Cahoes Co., supra note 87. The dangerous
character of explosions of dynamite has been said to be a matter for judicial
notice. Chicago v. Murdock, supra note 69. In cases of consequential damage,
where the injury to buildings was caused by vibrations, it has been thought to
be against public policy to allow a recovery, "since public policy is promoted by
improvement of property." Booth v. Rome, etc., R. Co., 140 N. Y. 267, 55 N.
E. 592 (1893). Blasting by an independent contractor, when not clearly author-
ized or necessary, is a "collateral" act, and for damage caused thereby the em-
ployer will not be liable. McNamee v. Hunt, 30 C. C. A. 653, 87 Fed. 298 (1898).
89 Hoffman v. Walsh, 117 Mo. App. 286, 93 S. W. 853 (1906); Sullivan v.
Dunham, 161 N. Y. 299, 55 N. E. 923 (1906). Cf. Carson v. Blodgett Con-
struction Co., 189 Mo. App. 120, 174 S. W. 447 (1915).
90 Taylor v. Walsh, 193 Mo. App. 516, 186 S. W. 527 (1916). The work of,
blasting to construct a sewer, being intrinsically dangerous, the city is liable
for all damage resulting therefrom, however carefully or skillfully the work is
done. City of Joliet v. Harwood, 86 Ill. 110, 29 Am. Rep. 17 (1877).
91 Stone v. Cheshire R. Corporation, 19 N. H. 427 (1849). An independent
contractor, in pursuance of the contract with the railroad corporation, was blast-
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such liability depends on the inherently dangerous character
of the work or follows from the principle that one in posses-
sion of fixed property must use it, and see that it is used
only, so that other persons are not injured. In either case,
the liability is an absolute liability, in the sense that if there
is negligence, the employer is not protected by the fact that
the negligence was that of the contractor. Whether or not the
work was inherently dangerous is simply a question of fact.
2
-
It may be said, therefore, in view of the above discussion,
that in the first case which we proposed to consider-where
the blast is not fired on the street, but the injury occurs there
-that the employer, owning or controlling the land where
the blast was fired, is liable absolutely for the results of the
work performed by the independent contractor. The fact
that it was the contractor's negligence which failed to pre-
vent the harmful results is immaterial. If the employer
were the city, acting in a ministerial capacity, would it not
be held liable equally with private employers? If it were
held liable in such a case, it is independent of the control
of the streets, but follows from the same facts which impose
liability on private employers. Coming to the second case
which we propose to examine-where the blast is fired on
the street and the injury occurs there also, it seems that all
the reasons urged above for imposing liability exist-the city
owning or being in control of the street where the blast is
ing rocks; plaintiff, on the highway, was injured by stones. Held, relying on
Bush v. Steinman and Quarman v. Burnett, that the plaintiff could recover.
Accord: Carson v. Blodgett Construction Co., supra note 89; Sullivan v. Dun-
ham, supra note 89.
92 Analogous cases: U. S. v. Standard Oil Co. of N. 3., 258 Fed. 607 (1920),
aff'd, 264 Fed. 66, 12 A. L. R. 1404 (a contractor, with knowledge of the em-
ployer, permitted the dangerous practice of throwing hot ashes into oil-covered
waters, whereby barges were destroyed; this method of disposal was cheaper
and the work was being done on a cost basis); Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232
(1878) (fall of a party wall, built by defendant's independent contractors; case
follows Rylands v. Fletcher, and distinguishes Hilliard v. Richardson, 69 Mass.
-349 (1855), on the ground that in the latter case the acts causing the injury in
the highway were collateral, which seems to be a repudiation of Bush v. Stein
man); Hudgins v. Hann, 153 C. C. A. 313, 240 Fed. 387 (Ala. 1917), (owner of
a building is liable for injuries to persons or property rightfully near it, if they
could have been prevented by ordinary care, and the owner's liability cannot b-
avoided by' entrusting the care of the building to another).
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fired, its dangerousness being obvious unless the street is
closed to traffic. Yet, as we saw in the Herrington case,
relying on the non-applicability of respondeat superior, the
court neglected this phase of the question, and tacitly ad-
mitted that rocks thrown bya blast set off in the street by
an independent contractor, causing injury in the street,
would not make the city liable.
It must not be forgotten, however, that the Herrington
case was not one of injury by falling rocks, but because of
the noise created by the blast. The analogy with falling
rocks is pure dictum. The difference between the two situa-
tions may consist in the fact that noise is less likely to result
in harm than is a shower of rocks. The latter may be in-
herently dangerous whereas the accompanying sounds may
not be. Thus it has been held that a railroad company is
not liable for the operation of a steam engine near the high-
way, by an independent contractor, though a traveller was
injured through the fright of his horse. 3
In the City of Logansport v. Dick " we have a state of
facts satisfying the conditions we outlined above: Independ-
ent contractors under the city, blasting in the street, injure a
person using the,street as a traveller. The city was held'
liable, on the ground that it had failed to keep its streets
in safe condition for use in the usual manner. Howk, J.,
said:
But it seems to us, that, in view of the exclusive power
conferred, and of the correlative duty necessarily imposed, upon- the
appellant over the streets, alleys and highways within its corporate
limits, in and by the legislation of this State, providing for the incor-
poration of cities, the appellant could not and ought not be allowed
to avoid the imperative duty, which it owed to the public, to keep its
streets, alleys and highways in a safe condition for use in the usual
manner by travellers, nor to escape responsibility for its neglect or
failure to perform such duty, upon the plea that it had entered into
93 Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Farver, 111 Ind. 195 (1887). Cf. Water Co. v.
Ware, supra note 36.
•.14 70 Ind. 65, 36 Am. Rep. 166 (1880).
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY: NEGLIGENCE
a contract with another person for the performance of the work, which
rendered such use of the street, alley or highway unsafe or dangerous
to the travelling public." '15
The.court, in basing the city's liability on the ground of
its failure to keep the streets safe, said nothing about liabil-
ity, independent of the control of the streets, arising from
the inherently dangerous nature of the acts to be performed.
Yet it is submitted that this additional ground for imposing
absolute liability also existed. This view finds strong sup-
port in the reasoning of Water Co. v. Ware,"6 where the
independent contractor was responsible for frightening the
plaintiff's horse with the' noise of an engine and drill, and
the contractee, who was also a contractor, but directly under
the city, was held liable."7 Mr. Justice Clifford said:
"... Where the obstruction or defect which caused the injury
results directly from the acts which the contractor agreed and was
authorized to do, the person who employed the contractor and author-
ized him to do those acts is equally liable to the injured party." 98
In regard to the blasting cases, we may, perhaps, con-
clude:
1. It is impossible to reconcile them; "  2. If rocks are
!'5 Supra note 94, at 80.
96 Supra note 36.
97 Quaere, Whether the result would not have been the same in the absence
of the agreement on the part of the Water Company "to be responsible for all
damage which may occur."
98 Supra note 36, at 576.
09 Edmundson v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 1ll Pa. 316 (1885) (company held
not liable for blasting by its independent contractor, where the plaintiff's buildings
were damaged; court relied on Painter v. The Mayor, etc., of Pittsburg, 46 Pa.
213 (1863), and Wray v. Evans, 80 Pa. 102 (1875)-cases based on the argu-
ment that respondeat superior applied only to the immediate employer, and
that the inapplicability of this doctrine protected the employer of an independ-
ent contractor whose servants were negligent. Cf. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
v. Bonhayo, 94 Ky. 67, 21 S. W. 526 (1893) (if a landowner has caused injur',
to a neighbor's lands or buildings by his negligence in blasting, he is liable).
The city is not liable for the injury of an employee of the contractor while
driving near old, unexploded blasts. Salmon v. Kansas City, 241 Mo. 42, 145
S. W. 16 (1912). Accord: Staldter v. Huntington, 153 Ind. 354, 55 N. E. 8S
(1899) (plaintiff, working in sewer trench, was not using the street as a
traveller).
Cf. Lowry v. Carbon County, 64 Utah 555 (1924) (county, though a munici-
pal corporation, is a political subdivision of the state, created for governmental
purposes, and is not liable 'for a death caused by rocks from blasting).
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thrown onto a public highway from without, by the acts
of an independent contractor, and blasting was within the
contemplation of the contract, the employer will be held,
probably because the work was inherently dangerous; 3. If
the city, acting in a ministerial capacity, were such an em-
ployer, it should, logically, be held liable; 4. The same rea-
soning would justify imposing liability on the city when
blasting is done by its independent contractors on the public
street, and injury occurs on the street; 5. In this last case,
there is an additional, and controlling reason for holding the
city, i. e., it is liable for its failure to keep the streets safe
(note that the necessity for notice is obviated by the fact
that the blasting was within the contemplation of the con-
tract); 6. Where there is blasting on a public street, with
resulting damage to persons or property not on the street,
the question is a very different one, and the fact that the
city as such is the employer, and has control of the streets
as such, is not material.
In (5) above we said that there was the additional and
controlling reason for holding the city, that it was charged
with keeping the streets safe. Such liability is clear and easy
to establish. We do not have to go into questions of what
is inherently dangerous. As was done in Logansport v.
Dick,' 0 it seems desirable to keep this liability clearly in
view o
100 Supra note 94.
101 Blumb v. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 112 (1884), is directly contra to Logan-
sport v. Dick, on the ground that blasting is not a nuisance per se, and that
injuries from falling stones are not like injuries from defects in the streets. One
may. reply, as we have indicated, that the city's liability is based on control,
which should be extended to necessary superintendence of known blasting oper-
ations in the street. In Gerber v. Kansas City, 304 Mo. 157 (1924), a distinc-
tion is made. An independent contractor had left a dynamite cap in a pile of
dirt at the cdge of the walk. Some time later a little boy picked it up and *as
injured. The city was held liable for not keepinz the streets safe for the use of
the public, but expressly not liable for the negligence of the construction com-
pany, which (the use of the explosives not being unlawful) was "collateral" to
the performance of the contract. Cf. Sroka v. Halliday, 39 R. I. 119, 97 Atl.
065 (1916), where, after an exhibition of fireworks, a child was injured, a week
later, by picking up an unexploded bomb. It was held that the employer of the
independent contractor in charge of the exhibition was liable on the ground that
the contract called for the doing of things which were, by their nature, liable
to injure others unless precautions were taken.
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Nuisance. Many of the blasting cases might very well be
considered under the head of nuisance. In this section we
wish only to indicate what has already been said-that
though there may be absolute liability for the work per-
formed, because it is inherently dangerous or because it is
a nuisance, in all cases where such a nuisance has been
created in thehighway by independent contractors under the
city, the latter should be held liable primarily for its failure
to keep the highway safe."' Nevertheless, the liability in
both cases is absolute. Salmond says:
"Moreover, the rule of absolute liability for nuisance established
by Rylands v. Fletcher applies to the escape of things from the high-
way, no less than to their escape from the defendant's own land. He
who brings any dangerous thing upon the highway, or, interferes with
any dangerous thing already there, with the result that it does damage
on adjoining property, is absolutely liable without proof of neg-
ligence." 103
And a municipal corporation has been held liable, apart
from any proof of negligence, for the escape of inflammable
gas from the roadway.'04 Moreover, the employer of. the
independent contractor is liable in such a case though the
accident was due solely to the negligence of the independent
contractor.' 5
Our problem, however, is not covered by the situations
just mentioned. Suppose, in the Hardaker case, the gas had
exploded in the street at the time of the passage of a car.
Would liability then have been imposed on the council on the
102 In Connecticut the duty to remove a nuisance upon the public highway
is a "public governmental duty," and the city is not liable for its failure to per-
form it. Hewison v. City of New Haven, 37 Conn. 475 (1871). In Wyoming a
city is under no duty to abate nuisances, and is not liable for such defects in
the streets as constitute nuisances. Kent v. Cheyenne, 2 Wyo. 6 (1877).
103 SALNIOND, op. cit. supra note 41, at 245.
104 SALISOND, op. cit. supra note 41, at 246; Midwood v. Mayor of Man-
chester (1902) 2 K. B. 597.
1o5 "In Hardaker v. Idle Council District (1896) 1 Q. B. 335, the defend-
ant council employed an independent contractor to make a sewer in the high-
way, and by his negligence a gas-pipe was left insufficiently supported in an ex-
cavation made by him, with the result that it was fractured, and the escaping
'gas found its way into the plaintiff's house and there exploded. The council was
held liable although the accident was due solely to the negligence of an independ-
ent contractor." SALmoND, op. cit. supra note 104.
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ground of nuisance? Salmond again comes to our aid and
cites, though with apparent disapproval, the case of Charing,
etc., Co. v. Hydraulic Power Co.,' ' indicating that it would.
In the Charing case, the Court of Appeal
"professing to follow Midwood v. Mayor of Manchester, went con-
siderably further by holding that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was
applicable as between two companies using a highway as licensees
under statutory authority for the transmission of water and electricity
respectively; and the water company was held liable for the damage
done to the electric cables of the other company by the escape of
water from a broken main. . .. 1017
It may well be argued that if the water mains had be-
longed to the municipal corporation, the corporation would
be liable, exactly as the private company. Or if dynamite,
stored in the street, should explode, and injure either abutt-
ing property or passers-by, the city should be held liable,
though there was no negligence or though it were the negli-
gence of the independent contractor in charge. Here again,
though the city's liability could be said to result from the
nuisance, in the case of the passers-by, it would seem better
to urge as a primary reason for imposing liability on the city,
its failure to keep the streets safe. 108
lO (1914) 3 K. B. 772.
107 SALMOND, op. cit. supra note 104.
108 The statements in the cases as regards the application of the concept,
or concepts, of nuisance are so confusing as' to be of little help in analyzing the
cases. Nuisance is frequently suggested as a concurring reason for the imposition
of liability. One of the most inexplicable cases is Smyth v. City of New York,
203 N. Y. 106 (1911), where the property of an abutting owner was damaged
by the explosion of dynamite, stored in the street in charge of a sub-contractor,
under the general superviion of the Department of Combustibules of the Fire
Department. The city was held not liable (1) Under Uppington v. City of New
York, 165 N. Y. 222, 59 N. E. 91 (1901), which was a case of consequential
damage to abutting property by the sinkage of land in front of it; (2) Under
other cases supposed to hold that the city was not liable for the "default" of
the fire department. The dissenting opinion by Haight, J., would have held the
city on the ground that it had permitted, with notice, a dangerous nuisance.
Accord: Holman v. Clark, 272 Mo. 266, 196 S. W. 868 (1917) (it may be in-
ferred from the case that damages would have been allowed if the injury had
been to a person using the street as a way).
So Logansport v. Dick may be put on the ground that the city is under an
affirmative duty of superintending all independent street contractors to the end
that their work shall not result in nuisances dangerous to the public. This seems
to the writer an unnecessary confusion of two distinct bases of liability. Cf.
WHITE, op. cit. supra note 9, § 132.
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Indeed, the whole question of nuisance is made difficult
by the intangibility of the term.""0  To say that there is
liability in a given case because the obstruction is a nuisance,
or because the blasting of rocks is a nuisance, is little better
than saying that there is liability because there is an ob-
struction, or because rocks were blasted. Salmond has
pointed out the misuse of nuisance 'as a generic term in
broad sense."' Its limits are often very uncertain."'
But to come back to the main problem, what is the situa-
tion where an independent street contractor has done acts
amounting to a nuisance, and resulting in an injury to per-
sons on the streets? Is there an absolute liability imposed
on the city as employer of a contractor guilty- of creating a
nuisance, or simply as being in control of the land where a
nuisance was created, without respect to the relationship of
contractor-employer? If the latter, it is clear that we are
not concerned with the doctrine of respondeat superior, and
that the basis for absolute liability is similar to, but not the
same as, the absolute liability of the city based on its con-
trol, of the streets.
109 "As a matter of strict logic a particular thing cannot be both a trespass
and a nuisance . . . . Courts have been inclined to denominate as a nuisance all-
injuries to property which do not amount to a trespass and contain no element
of negligence or other culpability. It would seem to be more conducive to clear
thinking, however, to recognize definitely an indeterminate class of cases where
the defendant is liable at peril, but where the situation is not such as would
justify the court in giving an injunction; for example, explosives kept on land
may not be dangerous enough to warrant an injunction but dangerous enough
to impose liability at peril for damage done if they should explode." CLARK,
op. cit. supra note 37, at 119.
White has said: "A public street when opened for travel should be free, safe,
and convenient; and any unlawful substantial interference with these qualities
for an unreasonable time creates a public nuisance." WHITE, Op. cit. supra note
9, § 165. This of course has no reference to "public nuisance" in the criminal
sense, where, at common law the remedy was by indictment.
110 SALM1O.10D, op. cit. supra note 41, at, 216.
111 Scott v. Bay, 3 Md. 431 (1853); Hay v. Cahoes Co., supra note 87.
Both of these cases dealing with blasting. An action is maintainable against the
city for obstructing the street, whereby injuries are caused, on the ground ol
nuisance, when only the use is unlawful. A water pipe projecting an inch and a
half above the walk is not such a nuisance. Calvert v. City of Appleton, 196
Wisc. 235 (1928). Quaere, Whether the court wishes to say that the thing com-
plained of is not a nuisance because not unlawful, or is not unlawful because it
is not a nuisance? How would a court determine on the one hand whether such
a pipe was unlawful, or on the other, whether it was a nuisance?
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The creation of a nuisance per se is generally considered
to be an exception to the principal rule of non-liability of
the employer for the acts of the independent contractor."
12
Nevertheless, it is suggested that it would be more proper
to look upon the creation of a nuisance of this sort by an
independent contractor simply as a situation in which the
law-holds the person in possession of land liable, irrespective
of the source of the nuisance, the existence of negligence, or,
if it existed, who was guilty of it." 3
On the whole, any scientific application of the term
nuisance to a given set of facts is apt to be very difficult.
It is valuable as a shorthand term of description, but cannot
be used in analysis. In Cole v. Newburyport,"4 for example,
it was held that where a city has, for compensation, granted
the right to erect a booth on a public square, for the use
and exhibition of an animal, whose offensive appearance
and odor greatly frightened horses, the city is not liable for
an injury occasioned when the animal frightens a horse,
while the animal is being exercised on the highway outside
the booth. It has been pointed out elsewhere "I that "the
112 See Logansport v. Dick, supra note 94; Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48
(1851); Storrs v. City of Utica. supra note 85. Cf. Glasgow v. Gillenwaters, 23
Ky. L. 2357, 67 S. W. 381 (1Q02); Holman v. Clark, supra note 108; Pickett v.
Waldorf System, 241 Mass. 560, 136 N. E. 64 (1922); Woodman v. Metr. R. Co..
supra note 16.
113 In Nemet v. City of Kenosha, 160 Wisc. 379, 172 N. W. 711 (1919), the
city was held liable for the drowning of plaintiff's son at a municipal bathing
beacfi. Independent contractors, in laying a pipe for the city water supply,
across the beach, had left a ditch, because of which the boy's death was caused.
It was held: (1) The city, acting in a governmental capacity in maintaining the
bathing beach, was exempt from liability for the negligence of its agents; (2) In
furnishing water to private consumers, the city was acting in its private business
capacity, and was liable for the failure to exercise ordinary care. The court said:
"The construction of this excavation at a point adjacent to the grounds used by
the public, without giving notice of the presence of the danger, constituted a
nuisance, and the city is liable ,for the damage proximately caused thereby." The
opinion shows the feeling of the court that the condition created, or the work
done, by the contractors, was necessarily or intrinsically dangerous.
114 Cole v. Newburyport, 129 Mass. 594 (1880).
115 WHITE, op. cit. supra note 9, § 132 note. If we say that certain acts on
the part of the contractor are not a nuisance per se, quaere, whether it is no.
equivalent, both as a description and as to result, to saying that the employer is
not liable for the contractor's collateral negligence? Wabash, etc., R. Co. v.
Farver, supra note 93.
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license granted by the city carried with it the implied
license to bring the animal on the public street to and from
the booth where it was to be exhibited." * It seems to be a
fairly clear case of nuisance on property over which the
owner (the city) had control, for which the city should be
liable.
Our examination of nuisance as a basis for the employer's
liability for the work performed, indicates the following con-
clusions (the nuisance being created on the street and the
injury occurring there):
1. If the city's liability can be predicated on the nuisance,
it is an absolute liability; 2. The concept of nuisance is so'
variable as to make its application often unsatisfactory."' 3.
A much better test of the city's absolute liability is to ask
whether the city properly performed its duty to make the
streets reasonably safe for use. 117
3. LIABILITY, FOR THE ACTS OF THE CONTRACTOR WHERE
CITY Is NOT NEGLIGENT AND THE ACT IS NOT ONE
/ IMPOSING ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
In this section we have to deal with two classes of cases:.
(1) Where the city is liable solely because of its failure to
use reasonable care to keep its streets reasonably safe; (2)
Where the city is not liable because the act of the contractor
116 " 'Where the contractee employs the contractor to do work for his benefit,
which, in the ordinary mode of doing it, he, as a prudent man, has reason to
believe is a nuisance, he is liable for injuries that may result from it to third
persons. The reason for the contractee's liability is that the contractee is liable
for injuries resulting from his own unlawful act, and he cannot protect himself
from such liability by employing others, under the name of independent con-
tractors, to do the unlawful act. But where he, as a prudent man, has no reason
to believe that the act contracted to be done is a nu'isance, but is in itself law-
ful, and it turns out, during the progress of the work that it is necessary to-
create a nuisance ir) order to do the work, then the contractee is not liable for
injuries to third persons resulting from the nuisance before he had notice of its
existence . . . .'" Scott Const. Co. v. Webb, 86 Ind. App. 699 (1928).
117 This is not because one test is more precise than the other, but because
it is easier to hide behind a technical term with an uncertain meaning, than to
say that a thing is reasonable or unieasonable when the average man would
clearly think otherwise. Moreover, the principal reason is the one we have often
suggested-a clear perception of the underlying policy of making the city liable
for its failure to keep its streets safe.
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causing the injury was collateral, or where the act causing
the injury was not collateral, but the negligence was ,col-
lateral.
a. Permanent or Semi-Permanent Conditions. Wher-
ever the city is liable solely because of its failure to use
reasonable care to keep its streets reasonably safe, independ-
ent of the question of the existence of negligence in creating
the unsafe condition, or that of whose negligence created it.
but subordinated to the requirement of notice, we have what
we have defined as absolute liability for the care of the
streets."' The problems here are relatively simple, de-
pending upon what is reasonable care, what is reasonable
safety in the streets, and when it may be said that the city
has had notice. The necessity for notice is, in many cases,
obviated by the fact that the condition complained of was
of a permanent or semi-permanent character. Where there
was no notice, and the condition complained of was not of
a permanent or semi-permanent character, the city may be
held liable on the ground of nuisance." '
In view of what has already been said,12 it will probably
not be questioned that where the city has express notice of
the defective condition, and fails to use reasonable care to
prevent its causing injury, liability for injuries caused there-
by will result. 2 '
When, however, no actual notice of the defective condi-
tion is shown, though the city is not a guarantor of the safety
of its streets, if the condition is not merely i transitory one,
such as a hose across the sidewalk for momentary use by the
118 See note 41, supra, et seq.
119 Cf. Glasgow v. Gillenwaters, supra note 11,2 (municipality held liable
on the ground of nuisance where the contractor had stretched a barbed wire
across the street).
120 See notes 11-18, supra.
121 What is actual notice? It may be (1) knowledge of the condition itself,
or (2) it may be knowledge that certain persons are going to create certain
dangerous conditions; for example, when a sewer contractor is known to be at
work, and no official of the city has actually seen the work, or (3) knowledge
on the part of any or particular agents of the city; for example, a garbage col-
lector, a policeman, an independent contractor. Shall we say that notice to such
persons is notice to the city?
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contractor, 12 2 it would seem that the city ought to be held
liable. This is so since the city's duty in regard to the streets
is not simply to use reasonable care to keep them safe if it
knows them to be unsafe, but is~an active duty to take note
of their condition. "1 2 1 So, if defects in the street are of a
permanent or semi-permanent character, the fiction of con-
structive notice is adopted, by which the courts mean that
notice is not necessary.12 4
In City of Lincoln v. Smith 1" a hole ifi the sidewalk was
hidden by snow. The court held that actual notice of the
defect in the sidewalk was not necessary, if ignorance ol the
hole could arise only from afailure to exercise reasonable
official care. In Kunz v. City of Troy '2' a child was killed
while playing on a counter placed illegally on the sidewalk,
and left there for some time.12- Express notice was held to
be unnecessary in order to hold the city liable.1 8
122 Powell v. Village of Fenton, 214 N. W. 968 (1928) (hose pliced across
the walk by the fire department while fighting a fire). See Comment 26 Micir.
L. REv. 222.
123 Savannah v. Waldner, 49 Ga. 316 (1873); Birmingham v. McCrary, 84
Ala. 469, 4 So. 630 (1887); Jefferson v. Chapman, 127 I1. 438, 20 N. E. 33
(1889); Omaha v. Jensen, 35 Neb. 68, 52 N. W. 833 (1892).
124 Morris v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 101 Pac. 373 (1909).
125 28 Neb. 762 (1890).
126 104 N. Y. 344 (1887).
127 When the defect is hidden so that a reasonable examination would fail
to show it, the city has been held not liable. Schmidt v. City of New York, 179
App. Div. 667 (1917), aff'd 228 N. Y. 572, 127 N. E. 921 (defect seems to have
been almost impossible of detection); Dougherty v. City of New York, 146 App.
Div. 727 (1911) (very doubtful decision since the subway contractor knew that
the sidewalk was not properly supported). Contra: Biggs v. Huntington, 32
West W. Va. 55 (1889). Cf. Stanton v. City of Parkersburg, 66 W. Va. 303
(1909); Townley v. Huntington, 68 W. Va. 574, 70 S. E..368 (1911).
128 General note on the cases in this section:
(1) Actual notice. Previous notice in any form may be required by statute as
a condition precedent to a right of action for defective streets. Goddard v.
Lincoln, 69 Neb. 594, 96 N. W-- 273 (1903). Such a right of action is not a
common law right, and thus a property right which cannot be taken away by
statute because of the due process clause of the Constitution. McMullen v
Middletown, 187 N. Y. 37 (1907). Notice of the existence of the obstruction is
sufficient, not necessarily of its dangerous condition. Pettengill v. Yonkers, 116
N. Y. 558, 22 N. E. 1095 (1889). The city has notice of acts done under a
license, but after its expiration, notice is required of the conditions actually
created. Davis v. City of Omaha, 47 Neb. 836, 66 N. W. 859 (1896). Notice of
want of repair is required, but will be presumed where the defect is in original
construction of the street. Zeigler v. City of West Bend, 102 Wisc. 17, '78 N. %V.
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b. Collateral Acts. It is generally said that the em-
ployer of an independent contractor is not liable for the
collateral acts of the contractor, or for his collateral negli-
gence. For example, if a contractor is engaged for work that
no reasonable contractor would employ blasting in perform-
ing, blasting would be a collateral act; if blasting were con-
164 (1899). Cf. Rapho, etc., Townships v. Moore, 68 Pa. 404 (1871) (if defect
is latent or work of wrongdoer, express notice must be brought home).
In general, see the following: City of Lincoln v. Walker, 18 Neb. 244, 20
N. W. 113 (1885); Berger v. Philadelphia, 196 Pa. 41 (1900); Klepper v. Sey-
more Housing Corp., 246 N. Y. 85, 158 N. E. 29 (1927); John Wanamaker v.
City of New York, 197 App. Div. 44 (1921); Dowling v. City of New York,
239 N. Y. 535 (1924) (memorandum decision). In Connecticut, where the liabil-
ity of the municipal corporation is strictly limited by statute (as regards defects
in the streets), the case of ice-covered sidewalks is on a different basis. Schroeder
v. City of Hartford, 104 Conn. 334 (1926); Cloughessey v. City of Waterbury,
51 Conn. 405 (1885) (city must have notice and be able to remedy the defect
with a reasonable expenditure).
The city has notice of the work done under its authority or by its permis-
sion. By independent contractors: Storrs v. City of Utica, supra note. 112;
Brusso v. Buffalo, 90 N. Y. 679 (1882); Scanlon v. City of Watertown, 14
App. Div. 1 (1897); Reichard v. Bangor Borough, 286 Pa. 25, 132 Atl. 803
(1926); Anderson v. Fleming, 160 Ind. 597., 67 N. .E. 443 (1903); Prowell v.
City of Waterldo, 144 Iowa 689, 123 N. W. 346 (1909). Contra: Pemberton v.
City of Albany, 196 App. Div. 831 (1921) (plaintiff skidded on tar put on
street by independent contractor; held, time too short for constructive notice).
Work done by licensees ancA others. Myers v. City of New York, 154 App.
Div. 713 (1913); Russel v. Columbia, 74 Mo. 480 (1881); Shafir v. Carrol,
309 Mo. 463, 274 S. W. 755 (1925); Metzroth v. New York, 241 N. Y. 470, 150
N. E. 519 (1926). Compare: Blessington v. Boston, 153 Mass. 409 (1891);
Bennett v. Everett, 191 Mass. 364 (1906); Stoliker v. Boston, 204 Mass. 522,
90 N. E. 927 (1910). See also Benjamin v. Street R. Co., 133 Mo. 274 (1895);
Weber v. Buffalo R. Co., 20 App. Div. 292 (1897); Downey v. Low, 22 App.
Div. 460 (1897).
Knowledge of what agents constitutes knowledge on part of the city? Em-
ployees of department of public works: Minton v. City of Syracuse, 172 App.
Div. 39 (1916) (held, rule requiring notice of the defective condition of the
streets does not apply when that condition was created by servants of the city).
Policemen: Cohen v. City of New York, 204 N. Y. 424 (1912) (see particularly
the dissent). Sewers department: Richmond v. Jackson, 118 Va. 674, 88 S. E.
49 (1915). Independent contractor: Beatrice v. Reid, 41 Neb. 214, 59 N. W. 770
(1894); Hugo v. Nance, 39 Okla. 640, 135 Pac. 346 (1913). Cf. St. Paul v.
Seitz, 3 Minn. 250, 74 Am. Dec. 753 (1859).
(2) Permanent or semi-permanent conditions. Many of these cases would
also fall under the preceding section-"The city has notice of ivork done under
its authority or by its permission." Defects in original construction, knowledge on
the part of the city is conclusively presumed: Boltz v. Sullivan, 101 Wis. 608
(1899). Loosened stone: Turner v. Newburgh, 109 N. Y. 301, (1888). Ice
on sidewalk: Todd v. Troy, 61 N. Y. 506 (1875). Holes and bumps: Harvey v.
Chester, 211 Pa. 563 (1905); Norbeck v. Philadelphia, 224 Pa. 30, 73 Ati. 179
(1909).
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templated, but the contractor carelessly threw a cigarette
into the explosives, that would be collateral negligence.
Whether or not the distinction is practically important, since
it seems to exist, it may as well be made.
For our purposes it is possible to make another distinc-
tion: that of collateral acts taking effect on the street, from
those taking effect off the street. ''. Since the city is liable
for its failure to keep the streets in reasonably safe condition,
or at least for its failure to use reasonable care to that end,
it would seem that the city should not be able to set up as a
defense that the act was collateral, if it caused injury and if
the city had such notice as would make it liable if the act
were not collateral and injured persons on the street.180
Therefore, where the injury results from collateral acts or
negligence, and does not occur on the street, the situation is
the same as where the employer is a private individual, and
the work is to be done on the employer's land. For example,
in Hilliard v. Richardson,' the contractor deposited boards
in the highway, and a third person was injured. It was held
that the employer, and owner of the land, was not liable,
.121 Cf. Prowell v. City of Waterloo, 144 Iowa 689 (1909). McClain, J.,
said: "It may be conceded that even a municipal corporation is not liable for
the negligence of an indepiendent contractor in carrying on the work, if such
negligence consists in some fault or omission wholly collateral to the performance
of -the work to be done, and not necessarily involved in doing it. Thus ....
the negligence of the contractor in the use of dynamite or other blasting mater-
ials ...would not render the city liable for resulting injury, although the con-
.tractor was employed in performing work' on the streets. But on the other hand,
the duty-of the city to maintain its streets in a safe condition cannot be dele-
gated to an- independent contractor so as to relieve the city from liability for
failure to perform this duty." The inference is that the doctrine of collateral
acts is important only when the act caused injury off the street, or, when the city
had no such notice of the danger created or to be created on the street as to
place upon it the burden of takinr reasonable care to prevent harm to others.
But in this last case, the city would not be liable anyway-notice is essential
even in the case of absolute liability. In other words, the doctrine of collateral
acts has no special significance in the independent street contractor cases, except
that it is inapplicable when the injury occurs on the street.
130 Dean Thayer, in speaking of "collateral" acts of the independent con-
tractor, said: "So far as that most conveniently question-begging adjective
points to a definite conception, it seems to indicate a distinction according to the
definiteness of the danger inherent and visible ,in the nature of the undertak-
ing." Thayer, op. cit. supra note 65, at 810.
131 69 Mass. 349 (1855).
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since the act was wholly collateral. Nor is the city liable for
trespass by its independent contractor, 32 nor for the sinking
of land in front of the plaintiff's house, because of the negli-
gent way in which the sewer contractor did his work.'33
In such cases there is no question of absolute liability be-
cause of failure to keep the street safe. The only question is
whether the doctrine of respondeat superior applies-that is,
when we come to situations in which the contractor's acts
are not within the field of the employer's absolute liability,
we simply come back to the general rule which asserts that
the employer is not liable for the acts of the independent
contractor, although liability may be imposed in special
cases. This is in accord with what the cases have intimated
often, and with Dean Thayer's remarks, given above.' If
the employer-independent contractor relationship exists,
the ddctrine of respondeat superior is out of the picture.
When liability is imposed, it is for another reason-because
there is liability Wholly apart from the employer independent
contractor relationship. So, when we say that a certain act
is collateral, we simply say that the general rule is applicable,
or that the employer has no absolute liability. 33
132 Harding v. Boston, 163 Mass. 14, 39 N. E. 411 (1895).
133 Uppington v. City of New York, 165 N. Y. 222, 59 N. E. 91 (1901).
134 See note 67, supra.
135 McGrath v. St. Louis, 215 Mo. 191 (1908) (city not liable for contrac-
tor's trespass) ; Reed v. Allegheny City, 79 Pa. 300 (1875) (a contractor, grad-
ing a street, threw dirt on an abutting lot; held, the city not liable). Accord:
Bloomington v. Wilson, 14 Ind. App. 476, 43 N. E. 37 (1895). Compare the
last two cases with Broadwell v. Kansas City, 75 Mo. 213 (1881), where a re-
taining wall was necessary to prevent the raised street from encroaching on
abutting property; the city was held liable by applying the respondeat superior
doctrine. The result seems right, but quaere, whether the doctrine is applicable?
The city should be heia, of course, for its own failure to see that the necessary
precautions were taken. Cf. Chatahoochee, etc., R. Co. v. Behrman, 136 Ala. 508,
35 So. 132 (1902), where it is said that the employer is liable for such trespasses
only where the contract itself called for the particular act causing the injury.
The city is not liable for trespass by a licensee, operating a stone crusher in the
street, when he enters upon private property without the consent of the owner.
Somerville Fruit Farms v. John Petrossi Co., 124 Misc. 826, 209 N. Y. S. 367
(1925).
In Thillman, v. Baltimore City, 111 Md. 131 (1909), because of improper
paving by an independent contractor, water flowed into the defendant's cellar.
The court said: "It was the duty of the city to have this work so done that it
would not cause unnecessary injury to the public, or to owners of adjoining
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Even when the injury from the negligent acts of the con-
tractor occurs on the street, if the person injured is not using
the street as a highway, the doctrine which imposes absolute
liability on the city for its failure to keep the streets safe is
not applicable. Thus it seems that the fact that the act can
be styled collateral is immaterial-there would be no
liability anyway. In Salmon v. Kansas City,"" the ity was
held not liable for injury to the contractor's-employee, caused
by an explosion of dynamite.' 3 But in Gerber v. Kansas
City,1 s' where a little boy was hurt when he picked up an
unexploded dynamite cap, the city was held liable on the
ground that the street was unsafe, and that it was chargeable
with notice of the various facts.
Not much can be offered in support of the doctrine of
collateral acts as a useful concept. It is simply another of
those inexact technical terms to be used at critical moments,
when all general principles seem too elusive. By stating an
exception to an exception we finally reach again the general
rule that the employer is not liable for the negligent acts of
the independent contractor. We decide that it is time to
apply the second exception, when it is impossible, or incon-
properties, and it could not relieve itself of all liabilities by having the work
done by an independent contractor." Accord: Randall v. City of Chadron,'112
Neb. 120, 198 N. W. 1020 (1924). Contra: Callaghan v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah
300, 125 Pac. 863 (1912) ; Sappington v. City of, Centralia, 162 Mo. App. 418
(1911); Froelich v. City of New York, 199 N. Y. 466 (1910). The last two
cases involved the flooding of premises because of a culvert, made defective
through the negligence of ihe independent contractor.
13G Supra note 98.
137 In Wilton v. Spokane, 73 Wash. 619, 132 Pac. 404 (1913), the plaintiff,
employed by a licensee to dig holes for a line of poles, was injured by an un-
exploded charge of dynamite, left below the surface by an independent contrac-
tor. It was held that the city was not liable, the court saying: "There is no
evidence that the city had knowledge of the existence of this unexiloded blast,
and, of course, there was no sort of diligence that it could have exercised which
would have made it acquainted with the fapt."
In Julius Kerr Const. Co. v. Herkless, 59 Ind. App. 472, 109 N. E. 797
(1915), it was held that the city was not liable to one of two contractors
working-in the street for the negligence of the other. This would seem to be
correct, on the simple ground that the employer is not liable for the negligent
acts of the independent contractor. The other contractor was not using the
street as a street, and the fact that the harmful acts were not collateral, would
seem entirely immaterial.
138 Supra note 100.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
venient to apply the first, i. e., that is, when an independent
street contractor allows dirt to be banked into an abutter's
yard, the exception (to the general rule of non-liability)
which imposes absolute liability on the city for failure to
keep its streets safe for traveling, is not applicable. As an
exception to the rule of absolute liability we apply the doc-
trine of non-liability for collateral acts, when simplicity and
logic should send us back to general principles." 9 In Bailey
v. Winston, 4 ' the court said:
"The duty of the city to erect barriers and establish signals in
case of dangerous defects in the streets is not discharged by engaging
a contractor to perform it. But where the negligence relates to a
matter with reference to which the corporation is under no specific
obligation the liability rests on the contractor alone."
III. CONCLUSIONS: THE MODERN LAW
In those jurisdictions where the municipal corporation is
held liable for the defective condition of the streets, includ-
ing the great majority of American states, the early devel-
opment of this liability shows a great deal of indecision, due
to lack of a clear pronouncement on municipal liability in
general, as well as to uncertainty as to the exact limitations
of the independent contractor doctrine. 4' Instead of rec-
139 In Cary v. Chicago, 60 Il1. App. 341 (1895), a paving contractor,
using a steam roller, blew off steam, which ran away and caused an injury; held,
the city was not liable. Accord: Quenrud v. Moore-Seig Const. Co., 191 Iowa
580, 181 N. W. 16 (1921) (on the ground that the city had no notice of the
use of the traction engine, or perhaps no nofice of the fact that as 'used it
was a nuisance). The Cary case seems very doubtful, if the city had any notice
of the use of the roller, since blowing off steam is apt to be more or less auto-
matic action, which the driver cannot prevent if he wishes, if the pressure reaches
a certain point.
140 157 N. C. 252, 72 S. E. 966 (1911).
141 Barry v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 121 (1852); Blake v. St. Louis, 40 Mo. 569
(1867); Smith v. City of St. Joseph, 45 Mo. 449 (1870); Bowie v. Kansas City,
51 Mo. 454 (1873); Bassett v. City of St. Joseph, 53 Mo. 290 (1873); Welsh
v. St. Louis, 73 Mo. 71 (1880); Russell v. Town of Columbia, 74 Mo. 480
(1881); Painter v. Mayor of Pittsburg, 46 Pa. 213 (1863); Wray v. Evans, 80
Pa. 102 (1875); Mahoney Township v. Scholley, 84 Pa. 136 (1877); Burger v.
Philadelphia, 196 Pa. 41 (1900); Norbeck v. Philadelphia, 224 Pa. 30, 73 Atl.
179 (1909); Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48 (1851); Storrs v. Utica, supra note 85;
Hickock v. Village of Plattsburg, 16 N. Y. 161 (1856); Creed v. Hartman, 29
N. Y. 591 (1864).
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ognizing clearly that, on the one hand, the city was abso-
lutely liable, subject to certain reasonable requirements of
notice, for all defective conditions of the streets which
caused injury to persons using them as streets, and on the
other hand, that the independent contractor doctrine and its
exceptions, as well as the doctrine of respondeat superior,
were inapplicable in such cases of absolute liability, the
courts discussed these various concepts side by side, and per-
mitted them to become almost inextricably intertwined.
The result has been some confusion in terminology and
reasoning, with unnecessary use of such expressions as
respondeat superior, "inherently dangerous," "collateral
acts" and the like. Even in Pennsylvania, as will appear
from an examination of the cases cited in the previous note,
the liability of the city for the defects in its streets has been
firmly established, with some exceptions.
The subject of this paper, however, was the liability of the
municipal corporation for the .negligent acts of the inde-
pendent street contractor. Does such liability exist? The
answer is that it does not, in theory. The city's liability is
based on different, principles than those involved in the doc-
trine of respondeat superior. It is liable for its failure to
keep the streets safe, subject to the conditions of notice. In
many cases a distinction must be made between those using
the streets as such, and those who are there for other pur-
poses. In aH cases a distinction should be made between
injuries occurring on the street and those occurring else-
where. Though this appears rather obvious, it is a distinc-
tion which the courts have frequently failed to make.
William M. Hepburn.
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